This chapter deals with the new European and UK laws relating to the control of "spam" and "cookies". Spam is best defined as unsolicited junk email (though see below), while cookies (or "web beacons") are small text files placed on the hard disc of a computer user, usually without the consent or knowledge of that user, and used extensively on e-commerce sites to store data records about that user's transactions for purposes of profiling and marketing 2 . To understand the current regulation of spam and cookies and how European law has altered the shape of this area, we need now to extend our reach beyond the principal focus thus far in this volume on the Electronic Commerce Directive (ECD), to look at subsequent European laws.
0.025 cents to send -for the recipient, the costs will generally be far higher, both in terms of time, money and personal irritation. Given the traditional European view that spam, like ordinary junk mail, was primarily an annoyance to living persons in their private sphere, it was natural that the main legal response in Europe was to cite the protection offered by data protection (DP) law, even though those rules not only pre-dated the deluge of spam, but also 16 Dallman and Dowling noted in 1998: "The British Government is shortly due for a nasty shock due to their policy of connecting all schools to the Internet. Imagine the reaction when the tabloid press discovers that school children are being sent advertisements for pornography via the email accounts that the government has provided." Towards Useable Email, p 2 at http://ww.davors.org/legal/dmaspam.html. Oddly there have been no such scandals, though most schools in the UK now have draconian filtering and firewall systems in place which may have forestalled such. 17 "Spam rage" was plead in defence in the case of a Silicon Valley computer programmer, who was arrested for threatening to torture and kill employees of the company he blamed for bombarding his computer with Web ads which offered to enlarge his penis: see report of November 21 2003, at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,61339,00.html. 18 Or as the judge at first instance in the US District Court case of U-Haul International v WhenU.com Inc, CA 02-1469, plaintively puts it: "Computer users, like this trial judge, may wonder what we have done to warrant the punishment of seizure of our computer screens by pop-up advertisements that require us to click, click and click again in order to return to our Internet work." 19 were largely formulated before the arrival of the modern Internet 20 . DP law does indeed in general forbid the processing, which includes collection and transmission, of "personal data"
which identifiably describes a "living individual 21 " without the consent of that individual. It also bans in particular the use of personal data by direct marketers if the individual whom those details describe refuses to allow them use 22 . Such protection however is not available to corporations who are not living persons and thus incapable of being regarded as data subjects 23 . Since small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and sole traders suffer just as much or more economically from spam as individuals this is a major flaw in a DP-centric approach to spam regulation. The UK PECD regulations, as we shall see, do offer some limited extension of protection to juristic persons. In the US the situation is wholly different;
not only is there of course no omnibus DP regime, but it has also long been accepted, albeit with some reluctance, that direct marketing is a form of speech and as such protected by First
Amendments rights, although the protection given is much less than that which would be accorded non-commercial speech 24 .
And of course, for those few individual who do (mysteriously) take up the offers promoted by spammers, spam is not just a matter of disgust and invasion of privacy, but a serious cause of financial loss and personal dismay as a result of fraud. However such loss is usually covered by one or more existing laws relating to fraud in general, to mail fraud, credit card fraud or to abuse of phone lines or telecommunications 25 . Accordingly the EC approach has been that particular regulation of spam based on loss to living individuals should mainly be conceived as relating to dignitary (privacy) rather than economic loss. 20 See EC Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), implanted in the UK by the Data Protection Act 1998, and EC Telecoms Data Protection Directive, 97/66/EC, implemented in the UK by Telecommunications (Data Protection and Privacy) (Direct Marketing) Regulations SI 1998 No 3170 (relating to telephone solicitation). 21 See Data Protection Act 1998, s 1(1) and discussion in Edwards, supra n 1. 22 25 The Communications Act 2003, s 127 (1) makes it an offence to send by means of a public telecommunications network a message that is "grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character". Section 127(2) further provides that a person is guilty of a crime if he persistently uses a public electronic communications network to send messages he "knows to be false" -but, only if this is done "for the purposes of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety".
Economic impacts of spam: the Internet, the ISPs and employers
If offence and annoyance to individuals, plus some significant economic loss to a few gullible souls 26 was all the damage spam caused, there would be good reason to leave it solely regulated by DP law, or indeed, to leave it unregulated by law but solely by technologies such as filtering. But spam can also be seen as a problem which is mainly economic, not emotional, in impact; which impacts disproportionately on certain industry groups; and affects the public interest in general, more than private individuals -and this analysis points towards why DP laws are perhaps not the best way to regulate spam after all. DP laws are mainly intended to encourage administrative compliance by responsible businesses, and are ill suited either to punishing in a way that hurts those who flagrantly disrespect the law, nor to compensating those who suffer financially as a result of spam. At the moment in the UK, the maximum fine for breaching an enforcement order served by the Information Commissioner is £5,000 unless the trial goes before a jury, and in practice, prosecutions of any kind are rare to non-existent and fines low 27 . By comparison, ICSTIS, the regulator for breaches of the code of usage of premium rate phone lines, has recently imposed fines of up to £75,000 on spammers who came under its jurisdiction as they were fraudulently encouraging users to run up charges on premium rate lines 28 . There are no jail sentences available for even the most persistent spammers 29 . Individual compensation for victims of breaches of DP law is possible 30 , but there are no reported cases of an individual ever succeeding in gaining damages in the context of spam, and given the cost of legal proceedings, the lack of precedents and the likely nominal sum that might be awarded, it is unlikely any will arise 31 .
Arguably this will exempt most spammers, who just want to make a buck not cause alarm. 26 It is often incredulously asked: "But who actually responds to spam? How do spammers make money?" A number of explanations are put forward in the literature. One is that most spammers make money from selling other spammers software and mailing lists of spam-able addresses. A variation on this is that spammers are only trying to obtain personal details, not actual customers, so as to perpetrate further frauds and identity thefts. Another view is that the costs of spam are so low and billions of messages so easy to send, that a tiny return rate will still turn a profit. Victims are also often unlikely to complain and reveal their own gullibility so, as frauds go, it is a very safe one. 41 Ibid, s 17(1). 42 Ibid, s 13. 43 Ibid, s 21. 44 Ibid, s 1(1)).
There has been doubt on this matter in the past 45 . However, the PECD appears clearly to assume that email addresses if they do belong to a living person are to be regarded as "personal data" and this is also the approach taken, with some caveats, in guidance supplied by the UK Information Commissioner 46 .
Assuming the 1998 Act does apply to spammers, it was clear that on most occasions, the act of spamming would be prima facie in breach of the 1998 Act in multiple ways. For example, spammers typically fail to register with the Data Commissioner as required, and also fail to respect requirements such as data security and use only for stated purposes. Most importantly however, spammers invariably failed to meet the most significant DP rule, deriving from the First Data Protection Principle, that the consent of data subjects to the processing of their data must be obtained. Admittedly, such consent is not required if one of the other exemptions in Schedule 2 is applicable, but the only one that seems relevant to spam is that the processing is "necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller" which interests must be balanced against the data subject's rights, especially to privacy 47 . If the processing is detrimental to the interests of the data subject, as it arguably will always be in the case of spam, then the exemption is highly unlikely to exculpate the data controller.
The DPA 1998 furthermore gave the data subject the specific right under s 11 to demand to cease receiving -or to "opt out" from -the processing of his or her personal data for the purposes of direct marketing 48 by a data controller. This right was seen as important for consumer protection, even though anecdotal evidence showed that consumers rarely had either the knowledge or the impetus to seek out data controllers and express their desire to opt out.
"Opt-out" from traditional direct marketing was facilitated by the creation of the Mailing Preference Service, a voluntary "opt out register" run by the Direct Marketing Association 49 ,
where consumers could register their preference not to receive direct marketing. Direct marketers then came by virtue of s 11 under an effective obligation to check the names on the register and remove "opt-out" names before they sent out a mail-shot. Similar voluntary 45 See Edwards, supra n 1. 46 See Information Commissioner's Office DPA 1998: Legal Guidance at p 12, available at http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/. 47 1998 Act, Sched 2, para 6(1). 48 "Direct marketing" is defined for these purposes as "the communication (by whatever means) of any advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals" (s 11(3) and so includes spam as well as traditional junk mail. 49 See further http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/cms/DocumentUploads/The%20Mailing%20Telephone%20and%20Fax%20 Prerence%20Services.pdf .
preference services were established for fax and telephone "cold calling". No such voluntary register however existed specifically for email spam, unsurprisingly as, as noted above, spam comes overwhelmingly from spammers who are outside the EU, anonymous and uninterested in complying with EC or UK law. Spammers, of course, nearly always failed to respect the opt-out right even where they ostensibly provided an opportunity to opt out within their own emails or websites (usually of the "click here if you don't want to receive any more messages of this kind" type). Indeed, usually the spammer's reply-to email address proved either to be false or non-working or, as worst case scenario, to be a trap by means of which the spammers could verify the spam victim email address was indeed a valid one.
Other pieces of EC consumer legislation subsequent to the DPD also provided possible opportunities for enhancing protection from spam, but these were repeatedly not exploited, mainly due to the fervent opposition of the direct marketing industry. Consumers were, for example, guaranteed the right under the EC Distance Selling Directive 1997 50 not to receive unsolicited communications relating to distance selling from a business where they clearly objected 51 . This Directive, being of later vintage, was more clearly intended than the DPD to cover communications sent via the Internet as well as conventional mail and phone communications. 52 However since it again mandated only an "opt-out" regime, effectively it required no more protection be given by the UK in relation to spam than s 11 of the DPA 1998 already gave 53 . An "opt-in" minimum requirement, by contrast, would have meant that member states were required to legislate so that consumers would actually have to express a prior preference to receive unsolicited communications from the business in question before it would be legal for them to be sent such communications. Given consumer inertia, it was obvious (to everyone but the direct marketing industry) that such an approach would generally be more effective at controlling the increasing problem of spam, and protecting consumer privacy. It was not however at this time seen as the politically appropriate solution, at least in the UK, though several EC member states , notably Germany and Austria, did voluntary adopt an "opt-in" regime (and thus ban spam) relatively early on. 52 See Art 2 of the DSD and Annex 1, which specifically refers to "electronic mail". 53 The consultation paper issued by the DTI in November 1999 included draft regulations which contained alternate opt-out and opt-in schemes -however an opt-out scheme was in the end chosen.
Similarly, the Telecommunications Data Protection Directive 1997 54 , implemented in the UK by the Telecommunications (Data Protection and Privacy) (Direct Marketing) Regulations 55 , was introduced to deal with the growing problem of unsolicited telephone calls and faxes and was aimed at cutting down on such "cold calling" against the wishes of consumers.
Article 12 of this Directive again gave states discretion to implement using either an "opt-in"
or "opt-out" system, and again, the DTI chose after consultation to opt for the latter, so that those who wished not to receive unsolicited "calls" still had to register their opt-out (with, this time, the Telephone Preference Service) to achieve this effect. The DTI also made it clear during the consultation period on implementing the Telecoms Directive, that the Regulations, and in particular, the word "calls", were not to be interpreted to include e-mail solicitations 56 and thus even the mild regime of opt-out was not extended to unsolicited email either (although mobile phone text messages were deemed to be included in the word "calls" and thus, slightly oddly, did fall within the regime.)
It became clear that there were two clear problems with both the Distance Selling Directive and the DPA 1998 in relation to spam. First, the jurisdictional and resources difficulties of enforcing EU and UK rules against predominantly American spammers were almost insuperable. But secondly, even leaving the enforcement difficulties aside, the "opt-out" regime which both sets of rules imposed, was of very little practical help. Human nature is such that even faced with a constant source of annoyance, very few people are equipped to find out that a regulatory scheme exists which may help them, and even fewer will then make the effort to register their veto on spam. Most independent commentators agreed that an opt-in 57 It has however been argued that "opt-in" is rather easier for the seller to secure in relation to business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce than in the traditional postal or catalogue distance selling domain. Any consumer who buys something from a web site can be offered a box to click if they want to "receive further information". This will do as "opt-in"; there is no need for it be done via a central register as with "opt-out", so for small businesses, "opt-in" may actually be a cheaper regime under which to operate than "opt-out" where search fees of the opt-out register will be a significant overhead. 58 See Art 12(1). It is noteworthy that even in the US, the home of free speech, automated calling machines are banned (although enforcement of this is patchy) and this ban has been upheld as constitutional (see Moser v Federal Communications Commission 46 F.3d 970 (9 th Cir. 1995).
human salesperson (if one is available)when the call is answered. The reason why these means of selling were distinguished from ordinary distance selling was, in the case of faxes, because the costs of marketing were transferred from seller to recipient, and in the case of automated calling machines, because of the extreme aggravation they caused. Both reasons applied just as strongly to spam, and therefore the case grew ever more compelling for the EC to unambiguously prescribe an opt-in regime for spam, especially as spam ceased to be a minor consumer problem, and became the scourge of the Internet around the turn of the millennium.
The Electronic Commerce Directive
At this point therefore, it was particularly puzzling and frustrating that the drafters of the ECD failed to grasp the nettle and impose a spam opt-in regime on reluctant member states such as the UK. Attempts were made in the European Parliament during the passage of the ECD both to ban both spam and cookies outright (see further below) but these were in the end repelled. Instead the EC Commission restricted the reforms introduced by the ECD in this connection to some rather redundant transparency provisions in Arts 6 and 7. First, Art 6 required that (all) "commercial communications 59 " had to be "transparent" in the sense that certain information had to be made available which identified the sender, adequately disclosed the nature and conditions of promotional offers made by the communication, etc 60 . In many respects, these requirements duplicated the work already done in the Distance Selling Directive. Secondly, only unsolicited commercial communications had to be "identifiable clearly and unambiguously" as such to the recipient as soon as they arrive recipients who are spared the experience of opening a message labelled (say) "Advertising:
unsolicited mail message from unknown sender as fast as humanly possible, whether it comes from a respectable high street brand business, or from a Nigerian offering to deposit $8,000,000 in your account. Only by re-establishing a culture of trust via prior consent, the argument goes, can "responsible" direct marketing businesses operate effectively on the Internet again.
So far, so good. There are, however, significant exceptions to the new "opt-in to spam" rule.
Prior consent is not required if the details of the recipient were previously obtained "in the context of a sale of a product or service" so long as  (a) the recipient is given a clear, simple and free opportunity to opt-out of receiving spam each time a new communication is sent, and  (b) the goods or services were "similar" to those now being marketed 65 .
Privacy advocates might suggest that the correct way to interpret this provision is to regard the exception as only operating where an actual prior sale had occurred -ie, not where the consumer had merely browsed the site to check out goods, decided not to buy, but perhaps inadvertently given away their details, eg, by having to register to gain access to the website;
or by the collection of data via cookies (see below). The UK Regulations however take a different approach. So long as the business has legitimately obtained the contact details (in terms of the requirements of DP law concerning fair collection and processing), details can be used if they have been obtained in the course of the "sale or negotiations" [italics added]. Is merely browsing a site, perhaps to gain information or for price comparison, "negotiations"?
Guidance from the Information Commissioner -who is of course perhaps more privacyoriented than the DTI -suggests that "negotiations" require some kind of active expression of interest by the data subject in the company's products and certainly do not include the case where all that has happened has been the browse of a site and deposit of a cookie 66 . 
Assessment of legal solutions to spam, and alternative solutions to spam
The PECD brings one chapter in the battle to regulate spam by law to an end. The "opt-in" wars are over. But it still has to be asked, as it has been repetitively in this chapter, if this time-consuming hard-fought legal effort has been worthwhile. What will happen to spammers who continue to operate without obtaining prior consent? Spammers mostly operate outside
Europe and pay little attention to European law; they are generally very hard to trace; even if traced they can move swiftly from server to server in different countries; even if found, the work needed to bring them within European enforcement jurisdiction will be enormous; the resources to fight spam in this way simply do not exist in most European countries where spam law enforcement is primarily the remit of the under-funded data protection authorities.
There are very many spammers and very few data protection officials. To adopt Peter Swire's useful metaphor, spammers are "mice" not "elephants"
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. To add insult to injury, as noted above, DP sanctions in most of Europe are hardly at the punitive level which would seriously cripple a determined spammer or put others off entering the trade, the obvious message is that there has to be a better way to fight spam than this.
The Americans, with more years of experience at fighting spam via the law than we say, as opposed to providing a false name or a non-existent email return address, would be a breach of regulation 23. The US clear statute law reference to "origin of email" is to be preferred to the PECD emphasis on "identity of sender".
But although both these provisions are helpful to the cause of stamping out spam, again both fall foul to the problems of the resources needed for investigation, the number of spammers, the jurisdictional problems and the huge forensic difficulties of establishing that a particular . A third point is that although the EU has attempted to draft "technology-neutral" laws to fight spam and more generally protect consumer privacy, it has inevitably and continually lagged behind in the spam "arms race". Technical standards in their nature would have at least a better chance of dictating to spammers, rather than, as is currently the case, spammers using technology to outwit and out-race the law.
Technical solutions -the answer?
Within the knowledgeable Internet community itself, there has been consensus for several years that the best results will come not from legal regulation, but from "self regulation" by establish networks of compromised machines as future spam relays. 73 However "sexually explicit spam" has reportedly dropped by 78% since January 2004 reported the Internet company Postini, in October 2004. This bolsters the view taken in this article that spam regulation is mainly about economic loss and gain and not about "privacy" primarily. 74 The EU have continually attempted for the last few years to broker international co-operation on spam, particularly between the EU and USA, as has the UN organization, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), but the process remains slow despite mutual good intentions. Even intra-EU co-operation on spam law enforcement has been difficult to achieve. See latest communications from the EU Commission at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/146&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLangu age=en on encouragement of cross-Europe spam hotlines accessible to all EU citizens for the reporting of spam, and EDRI technical strategies 75 . There are a number of less or more successful approaches. The first line of defense has always been that ISPs, local network managers, and individual users can use filtering software to winnow out e-mails sent from the addresses (IP addresses and/or URLs) of known spammers. This however is only ever partially effective as the addresses of spammers change constantly and are in any case, as described above, usually disguised. There is some degree of co-operative "blacklisting" of sites and ISPs known to harbour spammers:
one such blacklist often consulted by system administrators is known as the Real Time Black
Hole List and is available on the Web 76 . Traffic coming from a blacklisted site will not be transmitted on via other networks or ISPs where administrators have consulted the blacklist, with the effect that the black-listed site becomes isolated from the rest of the Internet, effectively "sent to Coventry". However no such system is foolproof, and a site which is being unknowingly made use of by spammers against its own policies (a "zombie drone" perhaps), or one which is sending out multiple copies of an e-mail for a valid reason (eg an alumni emailing from a university) may find itself black-listed alongside the "guilty" sites. It has also been suggested that mistaken placing of a site on the list might be seen as libelous, which provides a disincentive to co-operate in providing information to the organizers or republishing the list. Philosophically, Lawrence Lessig, the highly respected Internet law guru, has lead a movement against "black hole lists" on the ground that they represent undemocratic unaccountable vigilante justice
77
. An extreme solution is to use a "white-list" ie, only accept email from a list of prior approved senders: this has obvious difficulties for agencies such as the government and universities, which constantly receive enquiries from strangers, as well as for most individuals.
The most currently promising technical solutions involve variations on configuring email servers, or more radically, redesigning the email standard format itself, to make it possible to spot any attempt to falsify or disguise the true origin of an e-mail message. 
Economic solutions
While we wait for technology to do its stuff, another set of possible answers to the spam problem has emerged which might be termed economic solutions would be to make a would-be email sender do a short puzzle before they sent an email, with no monetary payment involved: plausible in time costs, it is argued, for a sender of a single email, but not for a spammer sending millions. However a quick and highly unscientific straw poll by this author found that ordinary users were even more unwilling to waste time doing puzzles to send their everyday email than they were to pay for "postage stamps". A final, slightly more promising wrinkle, is to ask senders not to actually pay in advance, but to put a certain sum of money up front as a bond or guarantee
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: if the email they send is then rejected by the intended recipient as spam, the bond comes into operation, and a cost per email would be deducted. However a solution like this virtually requires recipients involved in the scheme to maintain a "white-list" of who they are willing to receive email from; which as noted above, is for many individuals and associations who anticipate email from strangers as well as friends, not a practical exercise.
Another quasi-economic approach focuses on enforcement of anti-spamming laws. As we have noted above, one of the obstacles to the success of all spam laws is the vast amount of spammers, the difficulties of bringing them to justice, and the limited amount of resources which can be devoted by law enforcement agencies, both criminal and civil, to the project.
Lessig has suggested that one way round this would be for the law to offer a "bounty" to private individuals who track down spammers. His proposal is for a law which would (a) require effective and mandatory labeling of all spam messages in their header so they could be filtered out -eg, by words such as "SPAM" or "ADVERT"; and (b) allot a "bounty" of, say 82 See "Fee-based Email Way To can Spam?", March 5 2004, at http:///www.CBSnews.com,. 83 The Economist, supra n 81, cites IronPort Systems in Silicon valley as already offering such a bond system to "legitimate bulk emailers" so they can differentiate themselves from spammers.
for example, may be revealed by cookies to be repeatedly surfing various websites which sell Nike or other brand trainers. This is valuable information, which can be used by the business itself, sold to competing businesses or to advertisers or used in combination with other information for data mining purposes 89 . Cookies of this kind are also useful to users: they enable sits to know you are, in essence, and are sometimes said to give the site a "memory";
there is no need to log in every time, and data such as delivery addresses and credit card details can usefully be remembered and filled in automatically for the user. Cookies of this kind are called "persistent" cookies, because they are not deleted but remain on the hard disc of the user more or less indefinitely. "Session" cookies are a very different animal. These are law 91 , the study team found only 5% of privacy policies were intelligible to the average consumer, using recognised plain English indices. What if (as seems anecdotally to be the case) consumers never read privacy policies anyway? What if a tick box is supplied, already ticked, which gives permission to set cookies, unobtrusively tucked away at the bottom of the page? Or a box whose rubric reads "Tick this box if you don't want us to set cookies", so putting the onus on the unsuspecting consumer? Neither of these would surely have been acceptable under a requirement of explicit prior consent, but may well be in an opt-out regime. The PECD recitals, from a consumer point of view, provide both bad and good news
here. "Information and the right to refuse, " runs recital 25 of the PECD, "may be offered once... also covering any further use." So it seems that if the consumer once has an "opt-out" style tick box offered to her on her first visit to a particular web site, and fails to notice it and take the appropriate action (assuming she even knows what it means), she need never be offered it again; and meanwhile persistent cookies can be set which will continue to gather information every time she subsequently visits that site. On the other hand, the recital goes on to require that "the method for giving information, offering a right to refuse or requesting consent should be made as user friendly as possible". One might hope that this might rule out the scenario described above. 92 However, leaving such important detail to the recital part of the Directive will do little for European uniformity, an obvious problem when websites largely operate without notice of or concern for national boundaries.
Another interesting point in Art 5(3) is that setting cookies is allowed without consent where "strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user" [italics added]. Many web sites at present, whether by intent or laziness, are designed not to work without cookies. These are however often cookies of the non-privacy invasive, session cookie type. Some will work without cookies, but not as well;
the Amazon site is a good example of this, as it (unusually) provides fairly good functionality without cookies, but popular features such as the "shopping cart" and "your preferences" do disappear. Many sites simply fall over if the user chooses to "turn off" or delete the persistent cookies for that site cookies. So depending on the interpretation of "strictly necessary", this provision may well be an open invitation to bypass the requirement of consent at all -in other 91 This survey is unfortunately no longer available on the Web but can no doubt be obtained from the Information Commissioner's office. 92 The NCC survey Consumer Privacy in the Information Age (December 1999, PD65/L/99) spoke to focus groups of consumers about privacy, and one of their strongest resulting findings was that consumers did not like the current variation in how consent is sought by tick boxes, and felt opt-in was much more in the best interests of consumers than opt-out. The report attaches a model standardised tick box format.
words, to retain the status quo. What it should do, however, is clearly distinguish between the setting of site-specific cookies (eg when Amazon sets an Amazon cookie), and the setting of third party cookies by the likes of DoubleClick
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. Since such ad-server cookies are invariably set invisibly, and not at the request of the consumer (for who would explicitly request ads?) it seems these cannot be covered. Hence it appears European consumers will in future have to be persuaded at least not to opt out of receiving cookie-enabled advertisements, at least once -an interesting opportunity if consumers are informed enough to grasp it 94 . In fact however, the majority of Internet ads are now served without the use of third party cookies at all, as popular browsers, such as later versions of Microsoft's Internet Explorer, are usually now set to block third party persistent cookies, using built in P3P 95 controls. The most pressing need to regulate cookies in the interests of consumer privacy may in fact thus have already come and gone.
Again, as with the spam problem, the cookie problem seems to have been solved (or at least on the way to solution) more effectively and speedily by "code" than by law.
The UK government has indicated in its consultation document and subsequent regulations for . This looks a lot like the cry of "essential!" cannot be co-opted for cookies which are there merely to enable third party advertising (or even advertising directly provided by the website owner?) , as that
is not usually the service the user was requesting.
What next?

Locational and traffic data
Spam and cookies are no longer the only privacy invading technologies (PITs) in the ecommerce market. The most novel parts of the PECD relate to control of locational and traffic data, where their use by service providers might have negative impacts on consumer privacy.
Locational data broadly refers to information that reveals the whereabouts of the user of a mobile phone or similar telecommunications device whose location can be traced and shared.
It can also includes information as to when a particular user was using a mobile phone at a particular location. Traffic data is data processed by the provider of an electronic communications network (such as a telecommunications or cable company or ISP) which relates to routing, duration or time of a communication. 100 While traffic data has long been collected by telcos and ISPs for the purposes of billing, capacity management, and other internal procedures, locational data is a relatively new concept. It is hoped that exploitation of locational data to provide "value added" services to mobile consumers will usher in a new profitable wave of mobile e-commerce ("m-commerce"). Locational data can be shared with or sold by the company originally collecting the data, to third parties who wish to provide services to users such as, eg, taxis, or fast food, or flowers. Typically, the third party service providers would use the locational data to provide the user with either information or the actual goods or services from the physically nearest relevant outlet. Locational data might also conceivably be used to serve relevant ads to mobile consumers direct to their phone, or even 99 Guidance, para 2.5. 100 Full definitions of both terms for UK purposes can be found at reg 2 of the UK PECD Regulations. Interestingly the UK definition of "locational data" is wider than that stipulated by the PECD itself.
hypothetically to direct tailored ads at computer-equipped billboards the consumer is passing by -the "intelligent billboard" concept.
In principle both traffic data and locational data have their quite proper, and potentially profitable, reasons to be collected. But they can also be privacy-threatening technologies. It hardly needs to be elaborated how useful it might be to a government, or an individual stalker, The PECD and the UK implementing Regulations do explicitly attempt for the first time to place limits beyond those of general DP law on how traffic and locational data can be processed. Art 9 of the PECD provides that locational data can only be processed, which includes use, sale and sharing, with the consent of the user or subscriber, and only where it is necessary to provide "value added" services. The key exception to this is if the data is anonymised. Furthermore, the service provider collecting and processing the locational data must inform the user or subscriber prior to obtaining consent of what the locational data may be used for -eg, what third party it might be given to provide "value added" services, and for how long. Users must also have the option to "opt out" of releasing locational data at any 101 UK PECD Regulations, regs 28 and 29.
particular point, even if they have given this prior consent. The consent required thus resembles the positive opt-in required for spam more than the consent required to receive cookies, and thus reflects serious concerns about how locational data might be used.
Traffic data processing is also restricted. Traffic data, according to reg 8 of the UK PECD Regulations, can only be collected for limited purposes defined as:
 management of traffic or billing;
 customer enquiries;
 prevention of detection of fraud;
 the marketing of electronic communications services
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; or  the provision of a value added service.
As discussed, a "value added service" is an extra service provided to a user/subscriber by use of locational or traffic data -possibly by a third party other than the telco or ISP. It is technically defined as any service which requires the processing of traffic data or locational data beyond that which is necessary for the transmission of a communication or the billing in respect of that communication 103 .
Even when traffic data falls within one of these permissible categories, further restrictions apply 104 . If it is to be processed for the purpose of marketing electronic communications services, or to provide value-added services, the user or subscriber to whom the data relates must give their consent. This consent may be withdrawn at any time. Even then, the data must be processed and stored only for the duration necessary for the relevant purpose. Aside from these particular exceptions, the general principle is re-stated from general DP law that when traffic data has fulfilled its function -it aided the transmission of a communication -it should be either deleted or anonymised 105 .
The future?
The outstanding question remaining is, is the PECD really "technology neutral"? Does it update the DPD with sufficient generality to protect consumer privacy against all foreseeable threats arising from new technologies? Sadly, the answer already seems to be no. . Most consumer concern around RFID has centred on their use in high street stores, basically as a more advanced form of barcode. If RFID tags, which are very small, are attached to, say, shirts, and not removed or deactivated at point of sale, whether deliberately or by accident, then the fear of privacy advocates and consumer groups is that they will operate as a sort of micro-bug, revealing the whereabouts of the buyer to unknown parties for an indefinite time after sale. In fact, RFID chips themselves usually carry no information except the inventory code and description for the particular item to which they were attached, and thus in themselves, do not identify the buyer, nor disclose personal data describing the buyer. However the identity of the buyer could conceivably be discovered if the RFID data was associated at point of sale with the personal identifying details of the buyer derived who bought the item using a means such as credit card, smart card or store card. Although this kind of scenario has caused a great deal of angst both in the US 109 and Europe
110
, the privacy concerns are actually rather limited. RFID chips are usually passive : that is, they do not broadcast their location as such, but need to be detected by readers at very short range, usually no more than six or seven metres away (many need even closer range 111 .) RFID readers cost £250 -£3000 each and therefore it is impractically expensive for RFID tags to be used as "bugs" except within a relatively small and circumscribed area like a school, supermarket, library or campus.
The question of how far RFID chips are truly a significant threat to consumer privacy is not however the point here. What is germane is that it is not at all certain if RFID technology is controlled by data protection law, even as updated by the PECD, and if it is, how it is so , might apply to some but not all data processors operating RFID chip systems in shops. So, for example, if Tesco's, the supermarket chain, attach RFID chips to the packets of razor blades they sell in order to monitor and prevent shoplifting, and legitimate buyers of razor blades pay by electronic means, then conceivably Tesco's will be able to tie the individual buyer to that packet of razor blades as it leaves the shop, and thus will be processing personal data during and after the purchase 114 . In that case, they might fall under duties including the need to give adequate notice of processing to consumers so as to obtain implied consent; they would have to notify the purposes for which they were collecting the data; and the security implications might have to be considered 115 . But if payment is made with cash, and Tesco's remove the tags at point-of-sale (as Marks and Spencers did, in their RFID test trials with clothing, to the approval of privacy activists) do any DP implications arise? Perhaps not. The area is grey in the extreme.
A further complicating factor is whether RFID tags fall under the new "locational data" regime in the PECD described above. Locational data is technically defined solely as " any data processed in an electronic communications network indicating the geographic location of the terminal equipment of the user of a public electronic communications service". As Brown notes, it is hard to say that an RFID tag -or even the goods to which it is attached or embedded -are "terminal equipment of the user"
116
. Undefined in the UK PECD Regulations, the obvious natural language interpretation would be that it refers to a mobile phone handset, a handheld PC, a laptop, or the like. The PECD also fails to define "terminal equipment" and interestingly, recital 35 of the PECD seems to imply that all locational data is also traffic data , ie data used to facilitate electronic communications-which makes it look even less like the kind of data stored in RFID chips or collected using them. RFID chips fundamentally track objects (including people); traffic data tracks electronic communications or messages. Yet if RFID chips are to fall within the DP regime, it would seem only sensible that they also fall within the locational data regime. What RFID does, then, is show that the supposedly "technology neutral" regulation of the EC's latest Privacy Directive falls down badly as soon as applied to even the first major commercial privacy-invasive technology to be developed since cookies.
To add insult to injury, the scenario explored so far, of RFID in supermarkets, is one where it is relatively easy to minimise privacy violations by simple means such as removal of the tags before the purchaser leaves the store. What of the more novel applications of RFID mentioned above, such as tagging of children, and of hospital patients, and even the already common use of contact-less RFID-chipped smart cards in business HQs and on public transport? 117 In these scenarios, the RFID chip persists and stays active and associated with the card-holder, and the privacy risks seem much higher.
116 Ustaran (supra n 112) however seems to take the view that RFID tags do constitute "locational data". Interestingly though, the Art 29 Working party document, also supra n 112, does not take a view on whether RFID tags collect or constitute locational data, though the document does assert that in many concrete cases, data processed via RFID tags will constitute "personal data". 117 Out-Law.com reports at 14/10/2004 that the US Food and Drugs association has approved the implant sub-dermally of RFID chips into patients so that they can be used to access what drugs the particular patient needs, with less chance of
In conclusion then, the terrain we have surveyed above, of the legal regulation of privacyinvasive technologies such as spam, cookies, traffic data and RFID, is not an inspiring one for lawyers and legislators. Law faces many problems in this area; the problems of jurisdiction, of enforcement, of trans-nationality, of making the public aware of and comprehending of their rights; of financing and training of enforcement authorities, and of interpretation when new technologies or new tweaks on old technologies come along. Overwhelmingly, the conclusion cannot be resisted that law will always be running behind technology in this area and that solutions may perhaps best be found not in new legislation, but in international and business investment in technical standards and development. Spam has not been arrested in the slightest by international legal developments but may be decimated in a few years if changes are made to the basic Internet and email technical standards. Cookies were argued over sempeternally in the European Parliament, but now as of early 2005 are almost a forgotten problem for technologists, and third party advert serving is almost a thing of the past. RFID is the new privacy problem on the block and already has muddied the new legislation which might have been hoped to control it in advance. Real control of privacy invasion by RFID is more likely to come from good practice in the commercial sector or a supervening technology which (say) blocks or de-activates RFID chips, than DP law reform. As Lessig might have said, it is easier to fight code with code, than code with law. Indeed, code usually trumps law.
It will be interesting to see if in five years time the legal framework for the protection of consumer and citizen privacy in Europe from technological threat has begun to recognize this hard truth. We need more, cheaper and easier to use privacy-enhancing technologies and less new law: discuss.
human error. They could also recognise and record data about allergies.
